Northern Africa World War II

Wars throughout mankind are generally analyzed more often than other incredible human events because various assumptions and conspiracies tend to surround them. The Second World War is one of the most scrutinized events throughout world history because of its massive effect on humanity itself. During World War II, the North African campaign played an important role between the Axis Powers and the Allies. American involvement in the European theater helped to shorten the length of the war in Europe, and restricted Soviet influence in the region. Despite superior numbers, Germany was not victorious in North Africa, mainly because Hitler did not place significant importance on those battles. Imagine if Hitler had been able to gain control over the Suez Canal and the Middle Eastern oil fields, what would’ve happened? Germany could have won the war, and the world would be entirely different now. This alarming danger is exactly why the United States and the Allies agreed that North Africa was the key to success in the European theater.  

     Occupying North Africa, the Suez Canal, and weakening the British Empire was Mussolini’s idea. Hitler had his plans set on conquering the Soviet Union. “In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote, “We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march towards the south and west of Europe and turn our eyes towards the lands of the East” (Hitler). He reluctantly reinforced the Italians with Rommel to prevent the Axis Powers’ embarrassment after they mishandled the job. “On September 13, 1940, the Italian Army in Libya invaded Egypt, an operation that would end disastrously for the junior member of the Axis” (Griess p.91). This horrendous defeat for the Italians was the beginning of Mussolini’s downfall and a major reason why Hitler felt the need to aid his fallen comrade. In The Second World War Europe and the Mediterranean Thomas Griess mentions Hitler’s motives: “He wanted to help Mussolini to repair the Axis Powers, clear a path for a Russian invasion, and deny the British air bases for an attack on the Rumanian oil fields” (Griess p.92).    

   From the German General Rommel’s perspective, on the North African front, both Cairo and the Suez Canal had critical strategic value to the Allies. Control of the Suez Canal by the Germans would have forced supplies to be shipped all the way around the African continent. This would have caused huge delays in receiving crucial supplies on the part of the Allies. This became the main objective of German General Erwin Rommel, also known as the Desert Fox. “Almost immediately after he had arrived in Africa, Rommel began to shove the British eastward through the sands toward the gates of Alexandria” (Collier p.42). A look at a geographical world map tells us that the coastal Egyptian city of Alexandria is located north of the Suez Canal. Fortunately, Rommel never received enough support from Germany to obtain victory in Northern Africa.  

   In contrast to Germany’s point of view, the Allies, most notably the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, favored hitting the so-called weak spots of the enemy territories. He most likely recalled World War I, where the British fielded a large army in Europe and sustained extremely heavy casualties. It was Churchill’s belief that in order to defeat the Germans, the Allies had to open a path into Europe. His idea was that Italy was the soft weak spot of Europe, and Berlin could be reached by crushing the weaker forces at that location. By attacking the weaker pressure points of the Axis Powers, mainly Germany, the Allies would be able to surround Europe.  

   At first, President Franklin Roosevelt took issue with Prime Minister Churchill’s strategic planning for an Allied invasion. “Roosevelt, insisted that American ground forces be committed somewhere in Europe during 1942” (Griess p.171). After several meetings to plan military operations, the Allied leaders agreed on the numerous advantages of capturing Northern Africa. The biggest advantage of the United States invading North Africa first was the importance of cooperation in difficult conditions. “The first thing learned was the validity of what was to become the opening sentence of FM 100-20 which states: Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces, neither is an auxiliary of the other” (General Jacob L.Devers p.7).

   Since the Nazis appeared to have stretched themselves thin in North Africa, this presented an easy target of attack in the early stages of the American build-up before the main fight in Europe. Germany had such a stronghold on Europe that if the United States went into Europe immediately a large number of casualties would have occurred. North Africa was a convenient military objective, essentially a practice field for the future Normandy invasion. “We could profit cheaply by our own mistakes and by the example of the British, who already had two years experience under their belts” (General Jacob L.Devers p.8). Allied troops gained combat experience which served them well in Italy and Northwestern Europe. In Impact U.S. Tactical Air Power in Europe, General Jacob L. Devers states: 

“Other things also were learned: The necessity for close formations, the necessity for fighter escort, the peculiarities of German planes and their weaknesses, the need for some method of blind bombing, the importance of constant photo coverage, and how to keep up with a front that was moving like an express train.” (General Jacob L.Devers p.7)  

   All of these learning experiences on the battlefield in Northern Africa trained the Allied forces, particularly the United States, of what to expect and how success could be achieved in Europe.  

   Ultimately, controlling the Mediterranean Sea was a very strategic battle plan for the Allies. Hitler’s worst mistake of all was his decision to attack Russia before he had completely crushed the British and the French on the other fronts. When Japan forced the United States into the war we almost did not learn from our previous World War I mistakes. The United States preferred a straight on attack into Western Europe instead of going into North Africa. We have the great Winston Churchill to thank that such a move was premature and unsustainable. He knew this was not something that could be done on the spur of the moment. It needed timely preparation. After joining the war the Americans had to recruit, train, and position the troops going to participate in the invasion in staging areas. Once we chose the right place to send the troops ashore, the rest as they say is history.

Works Cited

Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert. Morristown, NJ: Silver Burdett, 1977.

General Jacob L.Devers, Lieutenant General Elwood R. Quesada. Impact The Army Air Forces “Confidential” Picture History of World War II #7. New York, New York: James Parton & Company, Inc., 1980. 7.

Griess, Thomas E. “The Second World War Europe and the Mediterranean.” The Second World War Europe and the Mediterranean. West Point, New York: Square One Publishers, 2002. 92.

Hitler, Adolf. Stormfront. n.d. http://www.stormfront.org/books/mein_kampf/mkv2ch14.html. 26 October 2012.

“Free Photos and Images.” GoodFree Photos and Images, Public Domain , www.goodfreephotos.com/historical-battles/world-war-ii/valentine-tank-in-north-africa-during-second-battle-el-alamein-world-war-ii.jpg.php. 

“GoodFree Photos and Images.” Free Photos and Images, Public Domain,Photo by Official U.S. Navy Photograph, www.goodfreephotos.com/historical-battles/world-war-ii/us-rangers-scaling-the-wall-at-pointe-du-hoc-normandy-world-war-ii.jpg.php.